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PRIORITIES UNDER THE ILLINOIS MECHANICS'
LIEN LAW
LEE L. TUROFF1
The branches of jurisprudence which most frequently
bewilder the inexperienced practitioner are generally
those which have not been slowly molded by custom and
usage, but rather have sprung full grown from the halls
of the state legislatures. Human ingenuity cannot be
expected to provide at once a complete system of juris-
prudence, no matter how finely limited or closely defined,
that will foresee and accommodate the countless situa-
tions that may arise and that must be decided under that
system. Especially is this true of the Illinois Mechanics'
Liens Act.2
The Mechanics' Liens Act now in force in Illinois has
been subjected to judicial interpretation for more than
a quarter of a century, and the justices of our Supreme
Court have examined and elaborated almost every phrase
in the statute. Nevertheless, there are goodly portions of
the statute which are still unfamiliar to many members
of the profession. Perhaps the most perplexing sections
of the Mechanics' Liens Act deal with the various pri-
orities and rights of lien claimants and others having
interests in the property; and it is to problems arising
under these sections that this article will be devoted.
Some of the problems discussed here may have only an
academic value; others may have some practical value.
All of them, however, should be of interest to the legal
profession, especially at this time, when innumerable
foreclosure suits are pending in the Illinois courts.
Cases are numerous in which questions of the relative
rights and priorities of the parties litigant arise; but the
1 Member of Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
2 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. 1931, Ch. 82; Laws 1903, p. 230. Act of May 18,
1903, in force July 1, 1903. Former Acts: 1825, 1833, 1839, 1845, 1861,
1863, 1869, 1874, 1879, 1887, 1891, 1895.
3 In this connection reference will hereafter be made to sections 1, 3,
5, 7, 9, 15, 16, 19, 21, 24, 27, 28, and 33, which all have some bearing
direct or otherwise upon the questions of priorities between the parties
litigant.
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most common cases are those wherein the lien claimant
makes a contract with owner, vendee, or tenant and seeks
to enforce his lien against mortgagee, vendor, or land-
lord. Other problems that ,arise less frequently are
concerned with outstanding dower and homestead in-
terests.
Original and sub-contractors have a different status
under the lien act, although their remedies are similar.
An original contractor is one who has a contract express
or implied with the owner or his agent for the improve-
ment of the premises.' A sub-contractor is one whose
contract is not with the owner or his agent but with the
original contractor, and it is to cover some portion of the
work which the original contractor is obliged to per-
form.5 Under the lien act the original contractor has four
months from the date of completion or the last date of
delivery of materials or performance of labor in which
to file a claim for lien with the clerk of the circuit court
for the county wherein the premises are situated,6 and he
has two years from the same date in which to file a bill
in chancery to foreclose his lien.' He may, however, file
his bill within the four-month period and thus dispense
with the claim for lien.' The sub-contractor, however,
has only sixty days after completion of performance or
after the last date of the delivery of materials or fur-
nishing labor in which to serve notice of his claim on the
owner of the premises,' and he must file his bill to fore-
close his lien within four months after payment is due
4 See Mechanics' Liens Act, sec. 1, for a more complete definition.
See also Olson v. Sheffield, 90 Ill. App. 198; Wells v. Sherwin, 92 Ill.
App. 282.
5 See Mechanics' Liens Act, see. 21, for a more complete definition.
See also Henry Marble Co. v. Church, 205 1l1. App. 249.
6 See Mechanics' Liens Act, see. 7. Note, however, that in the event
the premises in question are registered under the Torrens System, the
claim for lien must be filed with the Registrar of Deeds and a memorial
thereof noted upon the Torrens' Certificate.
7 See Illinois Mechanics' Liens Act, sec. 9. See also In re Bickel, 301
Ill. 484; Philip Gollner Co. v. Gillette, 216 Ill. App. 25.
8 Marshall v. Butler, 174 Ill. App. 502; Dunham v. Woodworth, 158
Ill. App. 486. See also Illinois Mechanics' Liens Act, see. 7.
9 See Illinois Mechanics' Liens Act, see. 24.
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him.'0 His notice of lien may, however, be dispensed with
when the original contractor's statement to the owner
sets out the sub-contractor's claim.1 His notice of lien
does not protect him, however, even if served within sixty
days if the original contractor's statement does not in-
clude or includes incorrectly his claim where the owner
has paid the original contractor before the sub-contrac-
tor's notice of lien is served.
The question of whether or not the lien claimant can
claim a priority over an estate of homestead to which the
owner of the premises may be entitled can be settled by
a reference not to the lien act but to the chapter of the
statutes on Exemptions," where it is provided: "But no
property shall by virtue of this Act be exempt from sale
for non-payment of taxes or assessments, or for a debt
or liability incurred for the purchase or improvement
thereof." This clearly establishes the lien claimant's
superiority. If, however, the premises are owned jointly
by a husband and wife, and the contract is made with
either of them the question of the lien claimant's su-
periority over the homestead estate is settled not by the
Homestead Act but by section 3 of the lien act 4 which
provides that neither spouse can set up a claim of home-
stead in such a case to defeat the lien.
The second simple question is whether the lien claim-
ant can claim superiority over the dower interest of the
owners' spouse. The dower interest of the owner's spouse
has priority over the lien claimant unless the spouse had
knowledge of the improvement and did not give notice
in writing of his or her objection to such improvement
10 See Illinois Mechanics' Liens Act, sec 33. See also Western Valve
Co. v. Hardin, 181 Ill. App. 414.
11 Kiefer v. Reis, 331 Ill. 38.
12 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Halsey Co., 262 Ill. 241.
13 Cahill's Ill. Rev. St. 1931, Ch. 52, par. 3.
14 The end of this section reads as follows: , . . . and in case the
title to such lands upon which improvements are made is held by hus-
band and wife jointly, the lien given by this act shall attach to such
lands and improvements, if the improvements be made in pursuance of
a contract with both of them, or in pursuance of a contract with either
of them, and in all such cases no claim of homestead right set up by
a husband or wife shall defeat the lien given by this act."
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before the making thereof.15 The law on this point is
clear, but a great many lawyers fail to allege in their
bills that the spouse had notice of the improvements and
failed to make written objection thereto. Care should be
taken to make this allegation.
A question of major importance arises, however, when
the contract for the improvement of the premises is
made by a vendee in possession under an unrecorded
contract of sale and the lien claimant seeks to assert a
lien superior to the interest of the titleholder, the vendor.
Except as explained later, in all such cases the vendor's
interest in the property is superior and paramount to
the interests of the mechanic lien claimant. It would be
well in this connection, however, to refer to that portion
of the lien act which says, " . . . any person who shall
by any contract or contracts, expressed or implied, or
partly expressed and partly implied, with the owner of a
lot or tract of land or with one whom such owner has
authorized or knowingly permitted to contract for the
improvement of, or to improve the same, . . shall have
a lien . . . . '"" It appears, therefore, that if the lien
claimant is in a position to show that the contract for
the improvements for which the lien is claimed was made
by the vendee with the authority of the vendor or if the
latter has knowingly permitted the same, then in either
of those events the vendor's interest will be subject to
the lien claim.
Such is the law, and there are many cases in which the
courts of this state have so held. The difficulty arises
not in applying the law but in establishing the facts. In
some cases, the contract between the vendor and the ven-
dee for the sale of the premises will provide that the ven-
dee is to erect certain improvements or give him the
right to alter or change the improvements on the prem-
15 See Illinois Mechanics' Liens Act, sec. 1, the latter part of which
reads as follows: "This lien . . . shall be superior to any right of dower
of husband or wife in said premises, provided the owner of such dower
interest had knowledge of such improvement and did not give written
notice of his or her objection to such improvement before the making
thereof . ... "
16 Illinois Mechanics' Liens Act, sec. 1.
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ises. The vendor will then be presumed to have agreed
to the improvements and his fee will be subjected to the
contractor's lien." In other cases, however, the proof is
more difficult to obtain. But, in general, wherever the
vendor had knowledge that the improvements were being
made or that the contract was being entered into and had
failed to object and permitted the improvements to be
made, the law will hold the vendor's estate subordinate
to the lien claim.
Another question is raised when the contractor makes
a contract with a lessee and seeks to hold the estate of
the lessor subject to his lien. Generally, the same rules
are applicable here as are applicable to situations where
the vendee's contractor seeks to hold the vendor.' How-
ever, most leases expressly exempt the landlord's estate
from liens asserted by the tenant's contractors. Such
provisions have been held of no effect if not brought to
the knowledge of the contractor. Even if the contractor
has actual knowledge of such a provision in the lease he
can still maintain a lien superior to the estate of the
landlord by showing that the landlord had knowledge of
the improvements or of the contract and did not object
to them."
In many instances, the lease will bind the lessee to
erect certain improvements or to repair, alter, or re-
model existing improvements. The landlord will be
deemed to have authorized the contract and his estate
will be subject to the mechanic's lien.2" Even if in such a
case there is also a clause in the lease exempting the
landlord's estate from liability for such improvements
17 Henderson et al. v. Connelly, 123 Ill. 98; Builders Supply & Coal Co.
v. Eggmann, 190 Ill. App. 572; Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. G. L. Chem-
ical Works, 237 Ill. App. 246.
18 For decisions holding that the landlord knowingly permitted the
improvements to be made by the tenant see Fehr Construction Co. v.
Postl System, 288 Ill. 634; Friebele v. Schwartz, 164 Ill. App. 504; Wertz
v. Mulloy, 144 Ill. App. 329.
19 Loeff v. Meyer, 284 Ill. 114.
20 Haas Electric Co. v. Amusement Co., 236 ll. 452; Sorg v. Crandall,
233 Ill. 79; Crandall v. Sorg, 198 Ill. 48 (reversing 99 Ill. App. 22);
Carey-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Jones, 187 ll. 203; Henry v. Miller, 145
Ill. App. 628.
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and such clause is brought to the knowledge of the con-
tractor, the courts will hold it void "as a declaration, on
the part of persons engaged in the construction of a
building under circumstances which subject their prop-
erty to the mechanic's lien laws of the state, that such
laws shall not have operation against their property or
the property of one of such persons." 21 The courts hold
that the provisions in the lease obligating the tenant to
make the improvements serve to charge the landlord's
estate with the lien and the other provisions seeking to
save the landlord's estate from this liability have not
that effect but amount merely to covenants on the part
of the lessee to discharge the said liens.22
In cases of this nature the character of the improve-
ments must also be kept in mind. Improvements which
may be classed as trade fixtures and which are remov-
able by the tenant at the termination of the lease are not
sufficient to form the foundation of a lien maintainable
against the lessor's estate."
Another distinction is that between improvements and
repairs or, as is more commonly stated, between altera-
tions and repairs. Alterations are chiefly improvements
which change the character of the premises, while repairs
are usually improvements which restore thepremises to
a previously existing state and rectify decay or partial
destruction. Almost every lease obligates the tenant to
keep the premises in repair. This serves as sufficient
evidence of the landlord's authorization of the contract
for repairs, so the contractor's lien will attach to the
lessor's estate. However, the expressed authorization in
the lease for making repairs will not extend to altera-
tions. Here the contractor must produce other evidence,
21 Crandall v. Sorg, 198 Ill. 48; Loeff v. Meyer, 284 Ill. 114; Provost v.
Shirk, 223 Ill. 468; Haas Electric Co. v. Amusement Co., 236 111. 452.
22 Haas Electric Co. v. Amusement Co., 236 Ill. 452; Carey-Lombard
Lumber Co. v. Jones, 187 Ill. 203.
23 Southern Illinois Contracting Co. v. Launtz, 169 Ill. App. 87; Dar-
lington Lumber Co. v. Burton, 156 Ill. App. 82; Alexander Lumber Co.
v. Champaign Baseball Club, 201 Ill. App. 246.
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under the rules already given, in order to charge the
lessor's estate.4
The most perplexing of all the situations concerned
with priorities occurs in those cases where the lien claim
is not the only claim on the property but where there are
also mortgages and other incumbrances of record. Un-
der the present lien act, wherever and whenever the lien
claimant asserts a claim against property already subject
to one or more mortgages or trust deeds, the lien claim-
ant's remedy becomes extremely unsatisfactory. And
this is precisely the major point in nine out of ten lien
foreclosures.
The present lien act provides that where questions
arise between lien claimants and encumbrancers whose
incumbrances are of record before the making of the lien
claimant's contract, the lien claimant shall be preferred
to the value of the improvements erected on the premises
and the encumbrancers preferred to the extent of the
value of the land at the time of making the contract."5
This general statement of the law is subject to certain
qualifications, however, dependent on how carefully the
lien claimant has followed the time limitations for filing
his claim for lien or his bill to foreclose.
Regarding original contractors, the act provides that
if the lien claimant has filed his bill within the four-
month period, or his claim within the four-month period
and his bill within the two-year period, he is protected
and given priority over the owner, parity with other lien
claimants, and relative or proportionate priority over
encumbrancers in accordance with the provisions of sec-
tion 16 Of the act. However, if he fails to file his claim
for lien within four months but does file a bill after the
four-month period but within the two years allowed, the
proportionate priority over encumbrancers obtainable
under section 16 can no longer be claimed; and the lien
becomes subordinate, although it can be enforced against
24 On this general distinction see Hacken v. Isenberg, 288 Ill. 589 (re-
versing 210 11. App. 120).
25 See Illinois Mechanics' Liens Act, sec. 16.
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the owner.26 In the event a bill to foreclose is not filed
within the two-year period, the lien cannot be enforced
against anyone."2
Granting, however, that the lien claimant has complied
with the foregoing rules and has filed his claim for lien
within the four-month period and his bill within the two-
year period, what is his exact status under section 161
Section 16 reads: "All previous incumbrances shall be
preferred to the extent of the value of the land at the
time of making of the contract." The Supreme Court of
Illinois has interpreted the word "land" as here used to
mean "the land with such improvements as there are
upon it at the time of the execution of the mortgage."'
Although the court here used the word "mortgage" at
the end of the quotation, it is clear from the context that
this was a mistake and that the word intended was "con-
tract." That this is a true interpretation is established
by a long line of cases. The section then continues as
follows, "and the lien creditor shall be preferred to the
value of the improvements erected on said premises."
It is obvious that to satisfy the provisions of the act in
situations like these the moneys realized from a sale of
the premises must be apportioned. 9 The court is em-
powered by this section to ascertain "what proportion
of the proceeds of any sale shall be paid to the several
parties in interest." The court therefore determines the
value of the premises before the lien claimant makes his
contract and the enhanced value after the contract is
completed. The proceeds of the sale of the premises are
then divided into two funds having the same proportions
to each other as the values found have to each other.
26 For a fuller explanation of these rules see Illinois Mechanics' Liens
Act, see. 7. See also Denkman v. Newbanks, 220 Ill. App. 515; Lyle
v. Rosenberg, 192 Ill. App. 378.
27 See Illinois Mechanics' Liens Act, sec. 9.
28 Croskey et al. v. Northwestern Mfg. Co., 48 Ill. 481.
29 Bradley v. Simpson et al., 93 Ill. 93; Grundeis et al. v. Hartwell, 90
Ill. 324; Wing et al. v. Carr, 86 Ill. 347; Clark et al. v. Moore et al., 64
Ill. 273; Howett v. Selby et al., 54 Ill. 151; North Presbyterian Church
v. Jevne, 32 Ill. 214; Smith v. Moore, 26 Ill. 392; Raymond et al. v.
Ewing et al., 26 Ill. 329.
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The encumbrances then have priority over the one fund
and the lien claimant priority over the other.30
This procedure often proves impracticable. What, for
example, is the value of lien rights incident to a contract
to repair a roof of a large building where the contract
involves about five hundred dollars and the premises are
subject to a trust deed securing a bond issue of five hun-
dred thousand? A case is also conceivable where the
lien claimant's work has not enhanced the value of the
improvements; for example, a satisfactory heating plant
may be torn out to install one of a different character
but one which does not increase the value of the premises.
In such cases, a plausible argument might be advanced
that since no increased value resulted to the improve-
ments the lien claimant has no priority over the encum-
brancer.
The question of distribution becomes complex in most
cases because there is more than one lien claimant. Some
of the claimants may have an absolute priority over the
encumbrancers, others may have only a relative or pro-
portionate priority, still others may have no priority
whatsoever over the encumbrancers. The master and the
solicitors then have a difficult situation to handle.
Occasionally, the lien claimant may assert an abso-
lute priority over an incumbrance. In the first place,
although technically a secret lien, the lien attaches as of
the date of the contract." Suppose, then, that a contract
for improvements is made and subsequently the premises
are mortgaged and the incumbrance placed of record.
The lien claimant, by adhering to the statutory time limi-
tations, may file his claim later and still assert a lien
ahead of that of the mortgagee. This, of all situations
where the lien claimant has an absolute priority over the
encumbrancer, arises most frequently. However, it may
be well at this time to note another instance by no means
so common wherein the lien claimant may assert an abso-
30 See Stephen Love, Mechanics' Liens in Illinois (Callaghan and Co.,
Chicago, 1931) pp. 37 to 44 for a very clear and complete analysis of the
procedure followed in these situations.
31 See Illinois Mechanics' Liens Act, see. 1.
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lute priority over the encumbrancer, although the incum-
brance is placed on record long before the lien claimant's
contract is made. If the incumbrance is upon two tracts
of land and the lien claim is on one of the tracts only,
and thereafter the encumbrancer releases from the lien
of his incumbrance the tract not subject to the lien claim,
the encumbrancer will lose any priority, whether abso-
lute or merely relative, that he might have had over the
lien claimant. This results from the application of the
equitable doctrine of marshaling assets.8 2
Nor are instances lacking where even though the lien
claimant has faithfully complied with all the time limi-
tations, he cannot avail himself of the relative priority
provided for by section 16. These cases, however, almost
all hinge upon the doctrine of estoppel; that is, the facts
in the case are such that the lien claimant cannot be
heard to assert a claim paramount to that of the encum-
brancer. The most common cases are those in which
actions or statements of the contractor have led the
mortgagee to believe the building to be free of secret
liens and therefore the mortgagee has on the strength
of that belief paid out the loan.
There are also cases in which the facts are just suffi-
ciently unique to increase the rights of the encumbrancer.
For example, in one case there were three lien claimants.
The mortgagee used the proceeds of the loan to pay two
of them off. The court held that by virtue of the pay-
ments the mortgagee became subrogated to the rights of
the two lien claimants who were paid and was entitled
to share on a parity with the remaining lien claimant.3
The writer has made no attempt to elaborate on any
of the situations discussed. Reference by the reader to
the cases in the footnotes will satisfy any further curi-
osity on these matters. The writer's purpose has been
not to teach or elucidate the law, but merely to open a
few avenues of approach to the situations mentioned.
32 McCarthy v. Miller, 122 Il1. App. 299.
83 Clark et al. v. Moore et al., 64 Ill. 273. See also Stephen Love, Me-
chanics' Liens in Illinois, p. 31.
